Reputation mechanisms have become an important component of electronic markets, helping to build trust and elicit cooperation among loosely connected and geographically dispersed economic agents. Understanding the impact of different reputation mechanism design parameters on the resulting market efficiency has, thus, emerged as a question of theoretical and practical interest. Along these lines, this paper studies the impact of the frequency of reputation profile updates on cooperation and efficiency. The principal finding is that, in trading settings with pure moral hazard and noisy ratings, if the per-period profit margin of cooperating sellers is sufficiently high, a mechanism that does not publish every single rating it receives but rather, only updates a trader's public reputation profile every k transactions with a summary statistic of a trader's most recent k ratings, can induce higher average levels of cooperation and market efficiency than a mechanism that publishes all ratings as soon as they are posted. The paper derives expressions for calculating the optimal profile updating interval k, discusses the implications of this finding for existing systems, such as eBay, and proposes alternative reputation mechanism architectures that attain higher maximum efficiency than the, currently popular, reputation mechanisms that publish summaries of a trader's recent ratings.
Introduction
Reputation mechanisms have become an important component of electronic markets, helping to build trust and elicit cooperation among loosely connected and geographically dispersed economic agents (Resnick et al. 2000; Dellarocas 2003) . A number of well-known electronic markets, such as eBay, eLance, and Amazon Auctions, currently use reputation mechanisms as the primary method for eliciting honest behavior and, thus, for facilitating efficient transactions among strangers over the Internet (Resnick and Zeckhauser 2002) A typical reputation mechanism encourages traders to post feedback (consisting of numerical ratings and, in some cases, optional text comments) describing their experiences with their trading partner on a given transaction. Posted feedback is aggregated by the system and published as part of a trader's reputation profile. This profile is visible to all community members who might consider doing business with that trader in the future. In a well-designed mechanism, reputation profiles act as a deterrent that elicits honest behavior without the need to resort to the legal system: if traders believe that the consequences (partial or total loss of future business) of receiving negative feedback will be sufficiently severe, they will forego the temptation to cheat and will behave honestly towards their partners.
Information technology has added a large degree of flexibility to the design of reputation mechanisms. Online mechanism designers can control a number of parameters that are difficult to influence in offline settings. Examples of such parameters include the granularity of solicited feedback (eBay allows traders to rate a transaction as "positive", "negative" or "neutral", Amazon Auctions supports integer ratings from 1 to 5, other systems support even higher levels of detail), the amount and type of information included in a trader's reputation profile (most systems publish the sum or arithmetic mean of all posted ratings, some systems highlight recent ratings, other systems provide access to a trader's entire ratings history) as well as the frequency with which reputation profiles are updated with new information (most current systems make all new ratings publicly available as soon as they are posted). These parameters impact the consequences of a trader's current behavior on the community's perception of him in the future, and thus, his incentives to engage in honest behavior. It is, therefore, important and timely to examine the impact of such design choices on trader behavior and market efficiency.
Along these lines, this paper considers the impact of the frequency of reputation profile updates on cooperation and efficiency. I develop the main arguments by analyzing a market where a single seller offers goods (products or services) to a population of buyers and each transaction can result in either a high-quality or a low-quality good. The probability of a high-quality outcome depends on the effort (high/low) exerted by the seller. Such effort is costly to the seller and unobservable to the buyer. In such a setting, the role of a reputation mechanism is to induce the seller to cooperate (i.e. to exert high effort) as often as possible.
The principal, and rather striking, result is that, if the per-period profit margin of cooperating sellers is sufficiently high, it is possible to increase the average levels of seller cooperation and market efficiency by reducing the frequency of reputation profile updates. Specifically, I show that a reputation mechanism that does not publish every single rating it receives but rather, only updates a trader's public reputation profile every k transactions with a summary statistic of a trader's k most recent ratings, can induce higher average levels of cooperation, higher seller profits, and higher buyer surplus than a mechanism that publishes all ratings as soon as they are posted to the system. The intuition behind this result is related to the noisy nature of online feedback. In most practical settings, online ratings are imprecise indicators of a seller's true behavior. Even cooperating sellers might occasionally receive negative ratings, either because a buyer behaves irrationally, or because the transaction leaves a buyer dissatisfied for reasons beyond the seller's control (for example, because shipped items were damaged in the mail). Empirical results (Ba and Pavlou 2002; Bajari and Hortacsu 2003; Cabral and Hortacsu 2004; Dewan and Hsu 2004; Lucking-Reiley et al. 2000; Resnick and Zeckhauser 2002) , as well as our formal analysis later on in the paper, show that buyers "punish" sellers whose reputation profile contains negative ratings by placing lower bids. The incidence of "unfair" negative ratings, thus, hurts market efficiency for two reasons: first, "unfair" punishment directly reduces average seller payoffs; second, since sellers understand that, even if they cooperate, there is still a possibility that they might be punished, the difference in expected future profits that sellers obtain by cooperating vs. by cheating declines. This, in turn, reduces their incentives to cooperate.
Elementary probability shows that accumulating a number of ratings before updating a seller's profile and posting a negative rating only if all accumulated ratings are negative reduces the probability that cooperating sellers will be "unfairly" punished and, thus, the efficiency losses due to noise.
At the same time, however, increasing the updating interval allows a seller to cheat for several periods before news of his behavior become public knowledge. This increases a seller's temptation to cheat.
For reputation to remain an effective deterrent, the difference in expected future profits when the seller cooperates vs. when the seller cheats must be high enough to offset his increased temptation to cheat. This implies that, as the frequency of profile updates decreases, the minimum per-period profit margin that makes reputation an effective deterrent must increase. The resulting tradeoff imposes a limit into how many periods can elapse between profile updates: the optimal updating interval is the maximum number of periods for which a cooperating seller's per-period profit margin remains sufficiently high to make reputation an effective deterrent.
This work contributes to the growing IS literature on online reputation mechanisms. One stream of this literature conducts empirical and experimental studies of reputation mechanisms. A number of empirical studies have looked at the impact of a seller's reputation on the probability of sale and auction closing prices on eBay (Ba and Pavlou 2002; Bajari and Hortacsu 2003; Cabral and Hortacsu 2004; Dewan and Hsu 2004; Lucking-Reiley et al. 2000; Resnick and Zeckhauser 2002) . Other empirical studies have looked at the motivations for participation in reputation mechanisms (Dellarocas, Fan and Wood 2003) and the relationship between a trader's reputation and the probability of disputes (MacInnes et al. 2004) . Experimental studies have looked at how the amount of information provided by a reputation mechanism affects cooperation (Keser 2003) and how cooperation levels induced by reputation mechanisms compare to those induced by stable partnerships (Bolton, Katok and Ockenfels 2004) . Another stream of research focuses on analytical modeling of reputation mechanism design issues. The objective of that stream of research is to understand the limits of existing mechanisms and to propose improved architectures. Notable contributions include mechanisms for eliciting truthful feedback (Jurca and Faltings 2004; Miller, Resnick and Zeckhauser 2005) , studies of the length of public history on the outcomes induced by a reputation mechanism (Dellarocas 2005; Fan, Tan and Whinston 2005) , statistical techniques that reduce the impact of reputation mechanism manipulation (Dellarocas 2000) and distributed reputation mechanism architectures that do not require the presence of a trusted central repository of past ratings (Zacharia, Moukas and Maes 2000; Sen and Sajja 2002; Yu and Singh 2002) . This paper falls within the stream of analytical reputation mechanism research. It is the first study that looks at the implications of the frequency of reputation profile updates on market efficiency.
The study of reputation mechanisms in settings with pure moral hazard has some similarities to the literature on sanctioning mechanisms in environments with imperfect monitoring. A common setting of such papers is an oligopoly cartel where firms collude (i.e., agree to restrict their individual production levels) but cannot directly observe the production levels of their competitors. Each firm is then tempted to increase its short-term profits by defecting from the agreed-upon production levels. Green and Porter (1984) show that, if the common price is a function of the sum of every firm's production levels plus a random shock, firms can sustain collusion most of the time by reverting to price wars for a fixed number of periods if the common price falls below a critical level, irrespective of whether the price drop is due to somebody's defection, or to noise. Other papers that analyze similar settings include Abreu, Pierce and Stachetti (1986) , Fudenberg, Levine and Maskin (1994) and Tedeschi (1994) . The mechanisms discussed in this paper are similar, in spirit, to the sanctioning mechanisms discussed in that literature, in that they sustain honest seller behavior most of the time by threatening to shift the seller to "punishment states", characterized by lower cooperation and lower profits, whenever the seller receives negative feedback. The contribution of this paper is the study of the implications of the frequency of information dissemination about the seller's recent behavior, an aspect that has not been considered by any of the above papers.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3 shows that the upper bounds of the seller payoff and buyer surplus that can be induced through the use of any reputation mechanism are monotonically increasing functions of the profile updating interval. It then discusses three concrete mechanism architectures that attain maximum payoffs equal to these bounds. Finally, Section 4 concludes and points to avenues for future research.
The model

The setting
The setting that forms the focus of this paper involves a marketplace where, in each period, a monopolist long-run seller provides one unit of a product or a service ("good") to one of multiple short-run buyers. Following receipt of payment, the seller can exert either high effort ("cooperate") or low effort ("cheat"). The seller's action affects the probability distribution of the good's quality and, thus, its expected value to a buyer. The buyer observes the quality of the good delivered, but not the effort exerted by the seller. Moral hazard is introduced because high effort is costlier to the seller, who can reduce his costs by failing to exert high effort, providing the buyer with a good of lower expected value.
More formally, I analyze a setting with a monopolist seller who each period offers for sale a single unit of a good to m buyers. Buyer j has expected valuation w j for a good produced by a cooperating seller. The expected valuation of a good produced by a cheating seller is normalized to zero for all buyers. Under these assumptions the seller will not attract any buyers unless he can credibly promise to cooperate with positive probability. Buyer lifetime is exactly one period and in each period the m buyers are drawn from the same probability distribution, thus buyer valuations are independent and identically distributed within and across periods. There are an infinite number of periods and the seller has a period discount factor δ reflecting the time value of money, or the probability that the game will end after each period. Seller effort costs c if the seller cooperates. The cost of low effort is normalized to zero. The distribution of buyer valuations and the seller's cost of effort are public knowledge.
In each period a mechanism is used to allocate the good among the m buyers by determining the buyer that receives the good and the price she pays to the seller. Without loss of generality we assume that buyers are indexed according to their valuations (w 1 ≥ w 2 ≥ ... ≥ w m ). Furthermore, we assume that a second price Vickrey auction is used to award the good to the highest bidder. The winning bidder pays a price equal to the second-highest bid.
In the above setting the seller's objective is to maximize the present value of his payoffs over the entire span of the game, while the buyers' objective is to maximize their short-term (stage-game) payoff. It is easy to see that, in the absence of a sanctioning mechanism that induces seller effort (such as the legal system or a reputation mechanism), the only Nash equilibrium is one where the seller will always cheat. Knowing this, no buyer will post a positive bid and thus no trade will ever take place.
My model attempts to capture the essential properties of markets with pure moral hazard. In such markets there are no information asymmetries (adverse selection) and cooperation is primarily compromised by post-contractual opportunism (moral hazard). Specifically, a key assumption of the model is that there is one type of seller whose parameters (cost of effort, probability of high and low outcomes given effort) are common knowledge. Whereas the use of the term "seller effort" in the model specification points to markets for services, if one thinks of "seller effort" as describing the wholesale price paid for an item by an online trader (or the opportunity cost of parting with an item that exists in the seller's inventory), the model can also be used to describe certain auction-based retail product markets, such as eBay. In such markets, it is plausible to assume that all sellers are equally capable of successfully fulfilling a transaction. 1 If we can also assume that sellers are rational (e.g. that there are no "irrational" sellers who always cheat or who always cooperate) then there is no uncertainty about a seller's "type"; the primary uncertainty is whether the seller will behave honestly (by sending the promised item) or not (by sending an item of inferior quality, or nothing).
Reputation mechanisms
A reputation mechanism allows each period's buyer to report her satisfaction with the transaction to a central authority (the "center"). I assume that the mechanism allows the current buyer to submit one out of a finite set of possible reports r ∈ {R i |i = 1, ..., m}, where reports indexed by a higher i indicate higher levels of buyer satisfaction. 2 Buyer reports are connected to seller actions through a 1. The seller offers a single unit of a good, promising to exert high effort (as there is no demand for low effort).
2. The center publishes the seller's current reputation profile x.
3. Buyers bid their expected valuations for the good in a second price Vickrey auction; the winning bidder pays the second-highest bid.
4. The seller decides whether to exert high effort at cost c, or low effort at cost 0.
5. The buyer receives the good, experiences its quality, and reports on the quality of the good received to the center. The center updates the reputation profile of the seller accordingly. commonly known conditional probability distribution p(report|action) that specifies the probability of a given type of report given the seller's (hidden) action. I assume that the conditional distribution p(·|·) is exogenously given and depends on the set of reports supported by the mechanism and the properties of the trader population. The center aggregates all past reports and publishes a reputation profile for the seller at the beginning of each period. The reputation profile can be the unabridged history of past reports, or any (commonly known) function of that history.
The above specification implicitly assumes that, although buyers might make mistakes when reporting their satisfaction, they are not acting strategically: the conditional distribution of ratings given a seller's action is, thus, independent of the seller's current profile or the history of play. From a theoretical perspective this can be weakly justified if we make the assumption that buyers only transact with a given seller once (a reasonable assumption in some large-scale electronic markets).
Buyers are then indifferent between truthful reporting and untruthful reporting. Moreover, it is possible to devise a side payment mechanism that provides buyers with strict incentives for truthtelling (Jurca and Faltings 2004; Miller, Resnick and Zeckhauser 2005) . Such a mechanism can be easily combined with the mechanisms I present in this paper. Table 1 summarizes the stage-game that results from integrating a reputation mechanism into the bilateral exchange game that forms the focus of this paper.
Equilibrium concepts
The objective of reputation mechanisms in settings with pure moral hazard is to induce (at least partial) seller cooperation and thus to facilitate profitable trade despite the seller's short-term temptation to cheat. They accomplish this objective by inducing equilibria where the presence of negative ratings in a seller's profile shifts the seller to states of lower expected profitability. In such states, buyers (correctly at equilibrium) expect the seller to exert lower effort and thus place lower bids. If the present value of profit losses that are associated with negative ratings is equal to or higher than the short-term gains from cheating the seller has an incentive to avoid getting negative ratings by exerting high effort.
Reputation mechanisms typically induce multiple equilibria. Their analysis has thus traditionally focused on deriving upper and/or lower bounds on equilibrium payoffs that can be induced by such mechanisms (see, for example, Fudenberg and Levine 1992; Cripps and Thomas 1995; Cripps, Schmidt and Thomas 1996) . Likewise, my objective is to explore how the maximum equilibrium payoffs that can be induced by a given reputation mechanism depend on the mechanism's profile updating interval.
I restrict my analysis to the subclass of binary reputation mechanisms, that is, to mechanisms where buyers can only report the outcome of a transaction as either "positive" (satisfactory) or "negative" (unsatisfactory). I assume that both types of reports can occur with positive probability following both seller actions. 3 Specifically, I assume the following information structure:
where +, − indicate a positive and negative report respectively. The restriction to binary mechanisms is without loss of generality. Dellarocas (2005) shows that, in settings with pure moral hazard and two seller actions, for every multi-valued reputation mechanism there exists a binary mechanism that attains the same maximum payoffs. Therefore, all results of this paper also apply to mechanisms that support arbitrary (finite) sets of buyer reports.
The solution concept that I use in the subsequent analysis is the perfect public equilibrium (PPE) . A strategy for a long-run player is public if at each period it depends only on the publicly known information and not on any private information of that player. A PPE is a profile of public strategies such that, at every period and for every public history, these strategies are a Nash equilibrium from that date on.
Consider a reputation mechanism that updates the seller's reputation profile x every k periods 
The ex-ante expected surplus for the winning bidder is u b (x, i) = s(x, i)(ŵ 1 −ŵ 2 ) whereŵ 1 is the expected value of the highest bidder's valuation of a cooperating seller's output. Finally, the expected total surplus generated in the current period is
The seller will enter the market if and only ifŵ 2 ≥ c. Observe that, ifŵ 2 ≥ c, both seller profits and buyer surplus are proportional to s(x, i): higher levels of seller cooperation benefit all players.
Therefore, a public strategy that maximizes the seller's payoff also maximizes buyer surplus and thus social surplus (market efficiency). For that reason in the rest of the paper we can focus without loss of generality on finding reputation mechanism designs and seller strategies that maximize the seller's lifetime discounted payoff. For the same reason, I will be using the terms "seller payoffs" and "efficiency" interchangeably.
Throughout the paper I am implicitly assuming that the reputation mechanism operator (the "center") is a benevolent social planner whose objective is to maximize social welfare. In most real-life settings (e.g. eBay) the mechanism operator is a private for-profit entity that charges sellers and/or buyers a percentage of the price paid for each transaction. Given that higher cooperation results in higher expected auction revenue, a mechanism that maximizes social efficiency also maximizes the operator's profits. Even in a for-profit scenario, the operator, thus, has an incentive to design a reputation mechanism that maximizes the seller's average probability of cooperation.
Baseline case
The baseline case is one where the reputation mechanism updates the seller's public profile in every period with the latest rating posted by the most recent buyer (i.e. where k = 1). This case corresponds to the current practice of most online reputation mechanisms and has been studied by Dellarocas (2005) . It is instructive to review the essence of his results here. Let ρ =ŵ 2 /c; ρ is a measure of the expected stage-game profit margin of a fully cooperating seller (strictly speaking, the profit margin is equal to 100 × (ρ − 1)). Dellarocas shows that the set of PPE payoffs of a repeated game where the stage game structure is described in Table 1 , the reputation mechanism has information structure (1), and the entire history of past reports is available to buyers, is bounded above by:
Since all PPE that can be induced by reputation mechanisms that publish arbitrary (but commonly known) functions of the seller's history of past reports can also be induced by a mechanism that publishes the seller's entire history of past reports (because buyers can individually compute the relevant function and condition their actions on that function), the above equations express the maximum payoffs that can be induced by any reputation mechanism when k = 1.
Two observations are particularly noteworthy: First, the maximum PPE seller payoff that can be induced through the use of a reputation mechanism is strictly lower than the first-best payoff
that can be achieved in a (hypothetical) setting where a seller could credibly pre-commit to full cooperation. This efficiency loss is due to the fact that reputation mechanisms induce seller effort by threatening to shift the seller to states of lower profitability whenever negative outcomes occur. In such states, buyers (correctly) expect the seller to exert lower effort and thus place lower bids. Our model assumes that, because of noise, even a fully cooperating seller will receive negative ratings with positive probability α. Therefore, such lower profitability states will be reached with virtual certainty, reducing the seller's expected lifetime payoff (and also reducing buyer surplus and social efficiency). The average per period efficiency loss is equal to the probability of receiving an "unfair" negative rating times the present value of future losses associated with a negative rating.
Second, the maximum payoff obtains only when the expected per-period profit margin of a cooperating seller (ρ) is above a threshold. The intuition behind this result is based on the observation that the maximum punishment that a reputation mechanism can impose to a seller is total exclusion from the market (and, thus, loss of future profits). For reputation to induce cooperation the seller's profit margin must be high enough so that the present value of future profits obtained through cooperation (that the seller jeopardizes if he cheats) is sufficiently high to offset the short-term gains from cheating. The lower the minimum effective profit margin, the wider the range of settings where the mechanism can induce maximum efficiency. In settings where the actual profit margin of cooperating sellers is below the minimum, reputation mechanisms fail to induce any cooperation.
The basic conclusion of the preceding discussion is that, to increase efficiency, reputation mechanisms must find ways to minimize the probability of unfair punishment of cooperating sellers without substantially increasing the present value of the gains from cheating. The following section shows that, under certain conditions, both objectives can be accomplished by reducing the frequency of reputation profile updates.
Increasing efficiency by reducing the frequency of reputation profile updates
This section shows that the minimum efficiency loss and, in some cases, the minimum effective profit margin of a reputation mechanism can be decreased by reducing the frequency with which a trader's reputation profile is updated with newly posted ratings. The remarkable conclusion is that publishing less current information about a trader's recent behavior can, sometimes, induce higher levels of cooperation and market efficiency.
Two-state randomization mechanisms with infrequent updating
I introduce the main ideas of this paper by analyzing a simple but effective reputation mechanism architecture called a Two-State Randomization Mechanism with k -period updating interval (k -2SRM).
A k -2SRM is characterized by a binary reputation profile that each period can be either in the "good" state or in the "bad" state. Sellers always start the game from the good state. Every k periods the mechanism updates the seller's profile according to the following rule: If fewer than l of the ratings received in the most recent k periods (1 ≤ l ≤ k) are negative then the center keeps the seller's profile in the "good" state. Otherwise, the center changes the seller's profile to "bad" with punishment probability π k . Once the seller's profile becomes "bad", it stays "bad" permanently.
In the baseline case where k = 1, Dellarocas (2005) has shown that, if ρ is sufficiently high, there exists a punishment probability 0 < π 1 ≤ 1 for which we can construct a PPE with the following properties: (i) the seller always cooperates as long as his profile is "good", (ii) the seller always cheats (effectively placing himself out of the market) when his profile turns "bad", and (iii) the seller's lifetime discounted payoff is equal to the maximum payoff V * of equation (2). The following Proposition extends this result and characterizes some of the equilibria that can be induced by a k -2SRM for arbitrary updating intervals k.
Proposition 1:
1. The profile updating rule that induces maximum efficiency is one where l = k: at the end of each k -period block the center keeps the seller's profile in the good state as long as he has received at least one good rating in that block; the center changes the seller's profile to "bad" with probability π k if and only if all k ratings are negative.
Let
then there exists an equilibrium where a k -2SRM with l = k and punishment
induces the seller to cooperate as long as his profile remains in the good state and to cheat as soon as his profile transitions to the bad state. The present value of the seller's discounted lifetime payoff during periods when his profile is in the good state is equal to:
for some integer 0 ≤ i ≤ k − 1 then there exists an equilibrium where a k -2SRM
with l = k and
induces the seller to (i) cheat in the first i periods and to cooperate in the remaining k − i periods of each period block when his profile is in the good state and (ii) always cheat as soon as his profile transitions to the bad state. The present value of the seller's discounted lifetime payoff at the beginning of blocks when his profile is in the good state is equal to:
for all integers 0 ≤ i ≤ k − 1 then the only equilibrium is one where the seller always cheats and V * k = 0. ), the full cooperation equilibrium induces higher efficiency than any feasible partial cooperation equilibrium.
Note that Proposition 1 only establishes existence of a specific set of equilibria. In the baseline case where k = 1 it has been shown (Dellarocas 2005 ) that these equilibria attain the maximum payoffs that can be induced in this setting through the use of any reputation mechanism. The following Proposition shows that this property holds for all k ≥ 1.
Proposition 2: The set of PPE seller payoffs of a repeated game where: (i) the stage game structure is described in Table 1 , (ii) the reputation mechanism has information structure (1), (iii) the center updates a seller's public profile every k periods using the following updating rule: if all ratings received in the last k periods are negative then declare the outcome of the last k -period block as negative; otherwise declare the outcome of the last k -period block as positive, and (iv) the entire history of past k -period outcomes is available to buyers, is bounded above by:
where
Comparing equations (6) and (7) and noticing that, for i = 0, ρ 2SRM
and equations (5) and (6) reduce to (3) and (4) respectively produces the following result:
Corollary 1: The equilibria of Proposition 1 attain the maximum efficiency that can be induced through the use of any reputation mechanism.
In the rest of the section I will focus my attention on settings where full cooperation equilibria
is a monotonically decreasing function of k. It follows from (4) that V * k monotonically increases with k. One of the main results of this paper immediately follows:
Corollary 2: The maximum efficiency that is attainable through the use of a reputation mechanism is a monotonically increasing function of the seller's profile updating interval k. (and, thus, market efficiency) . To understand the intuition behind this result, recall, from Section 2.4, that the source of inefficiency in environments with noisy feedback is the fact that, even cooperating sellers will occasionally receive "unfair" negative ratings and will, therefore, be punished with positive probability. Increasing the profile updating interval to k periods and (probabilistically) punishing the seller only if he receives negative ratings in all k periods reduces the probability of "unfair" negative outcomes from α to α k and thus reduces the mechanism's efficiency loss due to 
noise. This observation also helps explain why the most "lenient" profile updating rule ("forgive" the seller if he obtains at least one positive rating in a k -period block and only consider punishment if all k ratings are negative) is also the most efficient one.
The updating interval k cannot be increased indefinitely. The longer the interval between profile updates, the higher the present value of the profit
1−δ c that a cheating seller can realize before information about his behavior becomes public (and the farther away the adverse consequences of such information). To induce the seller to cooperate, the difference between the expected present value of punishment associated with cheating vs. the corresponding value associated with cooperation must be increased accordingly. Since punishment for cheating consists of expelling the seller from the market with probability π k , the maximum possible punishment value is equal to the present value of future profits from cooperation. This, in turn, is a function of the seller's stage-game profit margin from cooperation ρ =ŵ 2 /c. One, therefore, expects, that, the longer the interval k between profile updates, the higher the minimum profit margin that is required to sustain incentives for cooperation.
This imposes a limit on how much k can be increased. The following corollary is an immediate consequence of the preceding discussion and Proposition 1:
Corollary 3: The profile updating interval that maximizes efficiency in a given setting is the
The relationship of the minimum effective profit margin ρ 2SRM
It is easy to show that lim k→∞ f (k) = ∞. As expected, as k grows, the minimum profit margin that is required to sustain cooperation goes to infinity. Furthermore, lim k→0+ f (k) = ∞,lim k→0+ f (k) = −∞, and f (k) ≥ 0 for all k ≥ 0. Therefore, f (k) has a minimum at k * > 0. This, in turn, implies that there exists 
Some algebraic manipulation reveals that ∂k * /∂α > 0 and ∂k * /∂δ > 0. The value of k * that minimizes the profit margin requirement is, thus, higher in settings where ratings are noisy (α is large) and/or where sellers have long-term horizons and transact frequently (δ is close to 1). Figure   2 plots ρ 2SRM k for some representative parameter pairs. Remarkably, there exist parameter ranges where increasing k above 1 both increases efficiency (by Corollary 2) and decreases the minimum profit margin that is needed for the reputation mechanism to be effective (and thus increases the applicability of the mechanism in a wider range of markets). The intuition behind this result is that, in settings where ratings are noisy or where sellers do not discount the future very much, increasing k above 1 decreases the mechanism efficiency loss (and, thus, increases the expected present value of future gains from cooperation that the seller jeopardizes by cheating) by an amount that is higher than the corresponding increase in the present gains from cheating. The net effect is to lower the minimum profit margin above which the threat of expulsion from the market becomes an effective deterrent.
Infrequent updating of eBaylike mechanisms
The preceding analysis shows that k -2SRM constitute an optimal reputation mechanism architecture in settings with pure moral hazard. Nevertheless, the practical implementation of such mechanisms in online markets faces several challenges. First, in settings with noise, cooperating sellers will eventually be expelled from a k -2SRM market with positive probability. Even though, in theory, this property does not make sellers worse off relative to any other reputation-mediated market (in terms of their exante average discounted lifetime payoff), the psychological impact of irreversible "unfair" punishment may deter sellers from joining such markets. Second, and perhaps more important, k -2SRM break down in settings where sellers can easily change identities. Easy identity changes constitute an important concern in many online settings (Friedman and Resnick 2001) . If sellers can disappear and re-enter the market with a new identity as soon as their profile transitions into the "bad" state, they have no incentive to avoid negative ratings. Therefore, sellers will always cheat, buyers will expect them to do so, and no trade will ever take place irrespective of the value of ρ.
Most existing reputation mechanisms prominently publish summary statistics of a trader's recent ratings. For example, the most visually prominent component of eBay's feedback mechanism is a table that lists the sum of positive, negative and neutral ratings received by a trader during the most recent 12-month period. Dellarocas (2005) analyzes an abstract model of this part of eBay's mechanism (previously known as a trader's "eBay ID Card"). Specifically, he considers a mechanism that, each period, publishes the sum of positive and negative ratings posted for the seller in the most recent N transactions, where N is a mechanism parameter chosen by the center. He shows that such an "eBaylike" mechanism can induce equilibria that attain the theoretically maximum payoff (2) irrespective of the number of recent ratings N that are summarized in the seller's reputation profile. In such equilibria, the seller cooperates with probability one as long as he has no negative ratings in his profile. Otherwise, he follows a mixed strategy where the probability of cooperation (and, thus, his expected auction revenue) is a decreasing linear function of the current number of negative ratings in his profile.
In addition to being "fairer" to cooperating sellers ("unfair" negative ratings due to noise will eventually be erased from a seller's profile and, thus, will only affect his profits for a finite number of periods) eBaylike mechanisms are better able to cope with easy identity changes. Specifically, in settings where traders can easily change identities, eBaylike mechanisms can still elicit cooperation if the center initializes the reputation profile of new sellers at the lowest-payoff state (i.e. if new sellers start the game with a profile that is seemingly full of negative ratings). Traders then have to "pay their dues" before they "clean their name" and transition to states of higher payoffs. Since traders understand that if they change their identity they will have to "pay their dues" again, this approach deters them from doing so (Dellarocas 2005). 4 This section studies the impact of infrequent updating on eBaylike mechanisms. Consider the following perturbation of the eBaylike mechanism presented in Dellarocas (2005) at least one positive rating in the k periods that comprise that block and negative if the seller has received no positive ratings in these k periods. In the rest of the paper I will refer to this mechanism as a k -eBaylike mechanism.
The following Proposition shows that, if ρ is high enough, there exist PPE where the efficiency induced through the use of a k -eBaylike mechanism increases with the updating interval k.
Proposition 3: Consider a repeated game whose stage game structure is described in Table 1 and a k -eBaylike mechanism with information structure (1). At the beginning of each period the mechanism publishes the sum of negative outcomes in the N most recent completed k -period blocks.
An outcome is considered negative if and only if all k ratings within its associated k -period block are negative. Let:
The following statements are true:
then there exists a perfect public equilibrium (PPE) where:
(a) the seller cooperates with probability one during all periods of a k -period block except the first one; the seller's probability of cooperation during the first period of each block is a decreasing linear function of the current number z of negative ratings in his profile:
(b) the present value of the seller's discounted lifetime payoff is maximized during periods when the seller has zero negative ratings in his profile; it is then equal to:
then all PPE achieve seller payoffs strictly below V * k .
Proposition 3 shows that reducing the updating frequency of eBay-like reputation profiles increases the maximum efficiency. The intuition is similar to that behind Proposition 1: evaluating a seller on the basis of multiple transaction outcomes reduces the probability that cooperating sellers will be unfairly punished and thus the probability that they will "spuriously" transition to states of lower average cooperation. At the same time, less frequent profile updating increases the seller's temptation to cheat and, thus, requires higher per-period profit margins to make the threat of reduced future profits an effective deterrent to cheating.
A comparison of Propositions 1 and 3 reveals that, although the maximum PPE payoffs that can be induced through the use of k -2SRM and k -eBaylike mechanisms are identical, the minimum per-period profit margin of cooperating sellers that is required to attain these payoffs is always substantially higher in the case of k -eBaylike mechanisms. From the expression of ρ EBAY k it is easy to see that each unit increase in k multiplies ρ EBAY k by a factor of 1/(αδ i ). On the other hand, Figure   2 shows that, for small k, increases in k have a much less dramatic impact on ρ 2SRM k .
The reason behind the difference is that k -eBaylike mechanisms offer less flexibility in punishing sellers who receive negative ratings. To see why, consider the simplest possible k -eBaylike mechanism:
a mechanism that only publishes a seller's single most recent k -period outcome (this mechanism is a special case of the above specification for N = 1). A seller's profile in such a mechanism can only be in two states: "good" (most recent k -period outcome was positive) or "bad" (most recent k -period outcome was negative). Let , i) ) denotes the number of periods within each block where the seller cooperates with positive probability. The probability that a seller who cooperates during Ψ(z) periods of a k -period block (and cheats during the remaining periods) will receive negative ratings in all k periods is equal to
The seller's value function is equal to: 5
subject to the following incentive compatibility constraints:
Equilibria that achieve maximum efficiency V (good) = V * k require that sellers cooperate with probability 1 on all k periods of blocks during which their profile is in the good state. Since a seller's temptation to cheat is highest during the first period of each block (when the consequences of cheating are farther away), for a seller to cooperate during all k periods of a block, the difference V (good)−V (bad) must be high enough to make him at least indifferent between cooperation and cheating during the first period of each block and to make cooperation strictly preferable to cheating during later periods of a block.
The only way that V (good) > V (bad) is if the seller receives lower auction revenue during periods during which his profile is in the bad state. This, in turn, will only happen if buyers believe that the seller will cooperate with lower probability during such period blocks and if, at equilibrium, it is rational for the seller to behave in this way, given the buyers' beliefs. Observe, however, that, because the mechanism has no memory, the seller's incentive compatibility constraint during the bad state is also dictated by the difference between the payoffs of the good and the bad state. We have already established that the difference V (good) − V (bad) must be high enough to make sellers at least indifferent between cooperation and cheating during the first period of each block and to make cooperation strictly preferable to cheating during later periods of a block. But this, in turn, means that the difference in seller behavior between the good and the bad state can only be during the first period of a k -period block. Irrespective of their profile state, in all equilibria that attain efficiency V * k , sellers will cooperate with probability 1 during the last k − 1 periods of all blocks. Therefore, k -eBaylike mechanisms can only credibly punish a seller by threatening to lower his payoff during the first period of a k -period block. As k grows, the gains from cheating grow accordingly, while punishment must still be restricted to one period. The only way that the threat of a single-period punishment can offset the gains from k -period cheating is if the single-period profit margin is very high.
The argument gets more convoluted for mechanisms that summarize more ratings (i.e. when N > 1) but the resulting intuition remains the same: To attain maximum efficiency, equilibria induced by k -eBaylike mechanisms require that the seller cooperates during the last k − 1 periods of a block irrespective of his profile state. 6 A seller's profile state only affects his behavior during the first period of a block and thus, irrespective of the length of each block, punishment for bad outcomes must be restricted to lowering the seller's revenue during one period. In conclusion, even though it is theoretically possible to increase the maximum efficiency of an eBaylike mechanism by reducing the frequency of profile updates, in practice this would only be feasible in settings with very high seller profit margins.
Sticky binary reputation mechanisms with infrequent updating
The past two sections have shown that the maximum efficiency that can be induced through k -2SRM and k -eBaylike mechanisms increases as the profile updating interval increases. However, both mechanisms have shortcomings that challenge the application of this idea in real-world settings. k -2SRM break down in settings where sellers can easily change identities. On the other hand, for all k > 1, k -eBaylike mechanisms can attain the maximum efficiency only if the per-period profit margin of cooperating sellers is very high; this precludes the use of infrequent updating in most eBaylike markets.
This section proposes a novel reputation mechanism architecture that combines the best aspects of k -2SRM and k -eBaylike mechanisms. The new mechanism has minimum effective profit margin requirements that are only marginally higher to those of k -2SRM. At the same time, it can induce cooperation in settings where easy identity changes are possible. For reasons that will become apparent below, I will refer to this mechanism as a Sticky Binary Reputation Mechanism with infrequent updating (k -SBRM).
A k -SBRM is characterized by a binary reputation profile that each period can be either in the "good" state or in the "bad" state. The mechanism's profile transition rules can be summarized as follows:
• When the seller's profile is in the "good" state, the mechanism performs profile updates every k periods using the following rule: if at least one rating received in the last k periods is positive then the seller's profile remains in the "good" state; otherwise the seller's profile transitions to the "bad" state.
6 See the proof of Proposition 3, Part 2.
• When the seller's profile is in the "bad" state, the mechanism performs profile updates every single period as follows: if the most recent rating is negative, the seller's profile stays in the "bad" state; if the most recent rating is positive the seller's profile reverts to the "good" state with transition probability 0 ≤ τ ≤ 1 and stays negative with probability 1 − τ . (Once in the "bad" state, the seller's profile, thus, becomes "sticky.")
The following Proposition characterizes some key PPE that can be induced through the use of a k -SBRM.
Proposition 4. Consider a repeated game whose stage game structure is described in Table 1 and a k -SBRM with information structure (1) and transition probability τ k = (αδ) k−1 . Let
then there exists a perfect public equilibrium (PPE) where the seller cooperates with probability one during periods where his profile is in the good state and with probability
during periods where his profile is in the bad state.
2. The present value of the seller's discounted lifetime payoff is maximized immediately following updates that leave his profile in the good state; it is then equal to:
Proposition 4, in conjuction with Proposition 2, implies that a k -SBRM with transition probability τ k = (αδ) k−1 can induce equilibria that attain the maximum PPE payoff that can be induced by any reputation mechanism with infrequent updating. Furthermore, the minimum per-period profit margin of cooperating sellers that is required for such equilibria to obtain is substantially lower than the corresponding minimum profit margin of k -eBaylike mechanisms and almost as low as that of k -2SRM (see next section). Finally, k -SBRM are robust to easy identity changes. In environments where sellers can easily disappear and reappear with a new identity, the center simply needs to initialize the reputation profile of new sellers at the "bad" state. New sellers then have to "pay their dues" by enduring an initial phase of lower profitability before they transition to the "good" state.
This makes it unattractive for them to change their identity at any point because they would then have to "pay their dues" again.
The intuition behind the lower profit margin requirements of k -SBRM is the fact that they allow more flexible punishment. k -SBRM induce full cooperation in the good state by threatening to lower the seller's profits in every period of the bad state. Furthermore, the stickiness of the bad state means that, once there, the seller will find it difficult to revert back to the good state. Both of these properties help make the prospect of transitioning to the bad state sufficiently unattractive to the seller to deter cheating, even for relatively small profit margins.
A numerical example
Consider a setting where: (i) the probability of a "spurious" negative rating is 10% (α = 0.1), (ii) the probability of a "spurious" positive rating is 1% (β = 0.99), (iii) the average item costs $100 to the seller (c = 100); the average auction closing price is $150 (ŵ 2 = 150), leaving the seller with an average profit margin of 50% (ρ = 1.5). Finally, (iv) annual interest rates are 5% and sellers transact, on the average, once per week; their discount factor, thus, is δ = 1/(1.05) are almost identical and remain below ρ for all k < 3.6. From Corollary 3 this implies that the maximum efficiency that can be induced by these two mechanisms in this setting obtains when k is equal to 3. Furthermore, from equation (3), the corresponding punishment probability of the k -2SRM is π 3 = 0.24 , whereas, from Proposition 4, the corresponding transition probability of the k -SBRM is τ 3 = 0.00998. The optimal k -2SRM, therefore, is one that waits to receive three new ratings between profile updates and expels the seller from the market with probability 24% if and only if all three ratings are negative. On the other hand, the optimal k -SBRM is one that waits to receive three new ratings between profile updates when the seller's profile is in the good state and transitions the seller to the bad state if and only if all three ratings are negative.
Once in the bad state, the mechanism transitions the seller bad to the good state with probability roughly equal to 1% whenever he receives a positive rating. 
Concluding remarks
The emergence of online communities has enabled the creation of low-cost online reputation mechanisms with global reach. Reputation mechanisms are redefining the age-old concept of word-of-mouth, allowing this powerful social force to be precisely controlled through the engineering of systems that mediate such communities. Understanding the full space of design possibilities of reputation mechanisms and the impact of specific design choices on the resulting social outcomes is an important research challenge introduced by these new systems.
This work contributes in this direction by examining how the frequency of reputation profile updates impacts the resulting trader behavior and market efficiency. Most existing reputation mechanisms update user profiles as soon as new ratings are posted to the system. The main result of this paper challenges this practice as it shows that, under certain conditions, cooperation and efficiency can be increased by reducing the frequency of profile updates. The paper's principal finding is that reputation mechanisms can induce higher cooperation and efficiency if, instead of publishing new ratings as soon as they are received, they only update a trader's public reputation profile every k transactions with a summary statistic of a trader's last k ratings. In settings with noise, infrequent updating increases efficiency because it decreases the adverse consequence of "spurious" negative ratings. At the same time, however, infrequent updating increases a seller's short-term profits from cheating and thus, the minimum future punishment threat that can sustain cooperation. On eBaylike mechanisms this second effect causes the minimum effective seller profit margin to substantially increase with k. The applicability of infrequent updating on eBaylike mechanisms is, thus, limited to items with very high profit margins. In contrast, our analysis finds that less frequent updating of two-state randomization mechanisms (2SRM) and sticky binary reputation mechanisms (SBRM) can sometimes both increase efficiency and decrease the minimum effective profit margin. Sticky binary reputation mechanisms have the additional advantage that they can sustain cooperation even in environments where sellers can easily change identities, and are, thus, better suited to online environments.
The results of this work suggest that some electronic markets might want to consider the use of sticky binary reputation mechanisms with infrequent updating as an alternative to the, currently popular, "eBay-like" mechanisms that publish summaries of recent ratings. The theoretical findings of this paper show that, for properly chosen k, such mechanisms can attain higher cooperation levels and, in some environments, sustain cooperation in a wider range of settings than eBaylike mechanisms. 7
Infrequent updating works best in settings where sellers have high profit margins, long-term horizons and frequent transactions, and where the probability of "spurious" negative ratings is relatively high.
In terms of future work, the analysis of this paper can be extended in a number of directions. First, I have looked at a setting with only two possible seller actions. An interesting extension is to consider environments with multiple, or continuous, seller actions. Second, I have assumed a monopolist seller. Dellarocas (2005) shows that, in simultaneous auction settings with large number of buyers, the equilibria induced by reputation mechanisms become asymptotically independent of the reputation of competing sellers. This, in turn, implies that all results obtained under the assumption of a monopolist seller are also approximately valid in large-scale online auction settings where large numbers of buyers select among several simultaneous auctions for the same good by sellers of different reputations. The usefulness of infrequent updating in competitive settings with small numbers of buyers is not covered by this result and, thus, would be a worthwhile avenue for future research. Third, I have assumed that seller costs and conditional probabilities of outcomes given effort are completely known to buyers. In some online environments it is plausible that there might be different seller types with different cost structures and/or conditional probabilities of outcomes, initially unknown to buyers. For example, in online marketplaces for professional services, such as eLance.com, professionals of varying (and privately known) ability levels advertise their services. In such settings, reputation mechanisms play a hybrid (discipline and learning) role: in addition to eliciting "good conduct", past feedback should, ideally, also help buyers learn something about the unknown properties (type) of the seller they are facing. The design principles of such hybrid reputation mechanisms constitute an intriguing area for future research.
where a, b) is the incomplete Beta function (Abramowitz and Stegun 1972, p. 944 ). The present value of a cooperating seller's discounted payoff while the seller remains in the "good" state is described by the following equation:
where 0 ≤ π k ≤ 1. If the seller always cheats when his profile turns bad, at equilibrium, no buyer will buy from him again. It is easy to see that this is a Nash equilibrium and that V bad k = 0. Rearranging, we get:
The above is maximized for π k equal to the minimum value that induces cooperation during all periods. Let 0 ≤ i ≤ k − 1 denote the index of a period within its block. Assuming that the seller cooperates during all other periods, the seller will cooperate during period i if and only if a one-period deviation from cooperation is not profitable. The probability of receiving l or more negative ratings in k periods if the seller cooperates during k -1 periods and cheats during one period is equal to the probability that the seller receives a positive rating in the cheating period and at least l negative ratings in the k -1 cooperative periods plus the probability that the seller receives a negative rating in the cheating period and at least l -1 negative ratings in the k -1 cooperative periods. This observation, plus the algebraic properties of the incomplete Beta function (see Abramowitz and Stegun, equations 26.5.10 and 26.5.25) give:
The incentive compatibility constraint is thus equal to:
Substituting (11) and (13) into (14) we obtain the equivalent constraint:
The smallest value of π k that satisfies the constraint for all 0 ≤ i ≤ k − 1 is equal to:
This value of π makes the seller indifferent between cooperation and cheating during period 0 of each block, and makes cooperation strictly preferable to cheating during later periods (because
for all i > 0). The intuition behind this is that the temptation to cheat is strongest during the first period of each block because then the consequences of cheating are farther away. Substituting this value of π k into (12), after some algebraic manipulation we obtain:
n! is the hypergeometric function (Abramowitz and Stegun 1972, p. 556) . From the elementary definition Γ(n) = (n − 1)! it is easy to see that −1) is a decreasing function of c. Therefore, for fixed a, b, F (a, b, c, z) declines as c grows. In the context of equation (15), the term F (1, k + 1, l + 1, α) attains its minimum value
Similarly, the term k l attains its minimum value 1 for l = k. Therefore, the update rule that maximizes efficiency is one that declares the outcome of a k -period block as negative iff all k ratings in that block are negative. The associated maximum efficiency and optimal π k are equal to:
The requirement 0 ≤ π * k ≤ 1 implies that the seller's profit margin must satisfy:
For ρ < ρ 2SRM k no 0 ≤ π ≤ 1 can provide sufficient incentives for seller cooperation during all k periods of each block. Since the temptation to cheat is higher in earlier periods of a block, one then looks for possible equilibria where the seller cheats during periods 0, .., i − 1 of each block for some 0 < i ≤ k − 1 and cooperates during the remaining k − i periods. In such equilibria, no transaction will take place during periods 0, .., i − 1 of a block and no ratings will be submitted for those periods. I assume that the center assigns "artificial" ratings to periods with no transactions. 9 I further assume that artificial ratings are negative with probability ξ. The present value of a cooperating seller's discounted payoff at the beginning of a k -period block where the seller's profile is in the "good" state is then described by the following equation:
where 0 ≤ π k,i ≤ 1. As before, V bad k,i = 0. Rearranging, we get:
The above is maximized for π k,i equal to the minimum value that induces cooperation during the last k − i periods of each block. This, in turn, is equal to the π k,i that makes the seller indifferent between cooperation and cheating during period i. The corresponding incentive compatibility constraint is:
The idea is that, during periods when no transaction takes place, the center flips a coin and assigns a "rating" accordingly.
The requirement 0 ≤ π * k,i ≤ 1 implies that the seller's profit margin must satisfy:
The minimum profit margin is minimized for ξ = 1, that is, when the center always posts negative ratings in periods where there are no transactions. Observe that, for ξ = 1 and i = 0, equations (20) and (22) reduce to (16) and (17) respectively.
Equation (20) can be rewritten as:
The above equation shows that V * k,i is a decreasing function of i as long asŵ
Therefore, the equilibrium that maximizes seller profits for a given ρ is the one where π * k,i corresponds to the minimum i for which ρ ≥ ρ 2SRM
.
Proof of Proposition 2
Consider a reputation mechanism that, every period, publishes some function h of the history of past k -period outcomes. The seller's public strategy is a vector s(h) ∈ [0, 1] k where s i (h) denotes the probability of exerting high effort during period i, i = 0, .., k − 1. The corresponding static best response of the short-term buyer j is to bid amounts equal to G ij = s i w j during period i. This results in expected period-i stage-game seller payoffs
denotes the number of periods within each block where the seller cooperates with positive probability. At equilibrium, during periods of partial cooperation (0 < s i (h) < 1) sellers are indifferent between cooperation and cheating. Therefore, the sum of the seller's cost of effort and continuation payoff that is associated with periods of partial cooperation is identical to the corresponding sum that is associated with periods of full cooperation. Based on this observation the seller's equilibrium value function can be written as:
where h + , h − denote the seller's profile following a positive and negative outcome in the current k -period block respectively. Incentive compatibility constraints imply that, at equilibrium, the seller will cooperate during period i of a k -period block if and only if:
The above equation gives rise to the following system of incentive compatibility constraints: From (25) this means that s i (h) > 0 implies s i (h) = 1 for all all i > i. This, in turn, means that all nonzero incentive compatible strategy vectors can be characterized by two parameters 0 ≤ j ≤ k − 1, 0 < x ≤ 1 such that:
In such equilibria, no transaction will take place during periods 0, .., j −1 of a block and no ratings will be submitted for those periods. As in Proposition 1, I assume that the center assigns artificial ratings to periods with no transactions and that artificial ratings are negative with probability ξ. Substituting (26) into the seller's value function we obtain:
The maximum seller payoff V (h) attainable through the use of a reputation mechanism is the maximum value of (27) that satisfies the following set of constraints:
follows assumption that V (h) is maximum payoff For a given j, the solution of the above constrained maximization problem obtains for x = 1,
and is equal to:
The requirement V (h − ) ≥ 0 implies that it must be:
Comparison with (20) and (22) shows that the maximum payoffs and associated minimum profit margins are identical to those obtained through the use of a two-state randomization device. The rest of the proof immediately follows from that observation and Proposition 1.
Proof of Proposition 3
Part 1. If N remains constant for the duration of the game, a seller's public reputation profile is completely characterized by the number of negative outcomes z in the current "time window". On the other hand, a seller's private reputation profile (known to the center and the seller) is equal to an ordered list of length N, consisting of the N most recent positive and negative outcomes in chronological order (earlier outcomes first). If we assign the digit 1 to a positive outcome and 0 to a negative outcome, each of the 2 N possible private profiles can be mapped to an N -digit binary number x between 0 and 2 N − 1 (for example, if N = 3 then the profile (+, −, +) maps to x = 101 2 = 5 10 , where the subscript denotes the base of the number system). In the rest of the proof I will refer to x as the algebraic representation of the seller's private reputation profile.
At the end of each k -period block the center deletes the first (earliest) outcome from the seller's private profile and appends the most recent outcome at the end of the profile. Algebraically, this operation is equivalent to: (i) taking the N − 1 rightmost bits of the binary representation of the original x (they are equal to the remainder of the division of x by 2 N −1 ), (ii) multiplying them by 2 (this appends a zero at the end), and (iii) adding 1 if the most recent rating was positive (this changes the tail zero to one). The private profile transition functions can thus be expressed algebraically as:
where ⊕ denotes the modulo (division remainder) operator. I will show that, if the profit margin of a fully cooperating seller is high enough, the above mechanism induces a cooperative equilibrium whose maximum efficiency increases with k. Let us assume that the seller follows a public strategy s = {s(z, i)|z = 0, .., N ; i = 0, .., k − 1} that depends on the number of negative outcomes z present in the seller's current profile x and the index i of the current period within its corresponding k -period block. The buyers' best response to the seller's strategy is to scale their bids by s(z, i), resulting in expected auction revenue s(z, i) ) denotes the number of periods within each block where the seller cooperates with positive probability. The probability that a seller who cooperates during Ψ(z) periods of a k -period block (and cheats during the remaining periods) will receive negative ratings in all k periods is equal to α Ψ(z(x)) β k−Ψ(z(x)) . The seller's value function is equal to 10 :
The seller will cooperate during period i of a k -period block if and only if:
The above equation gives rise to the following system of incentive compatibility constraints: I will assume that the seller follows a mixed strategy conditioned on the number of negative outcomes z in his public reputation profile. Specifically, let:
that is, the seller cooperates as long as there are no negative outcomes in his profile and his probability of cooperation during the first period of each block decreases by a fixed amount θ with every additional negative outcome on his public reputation profile. I will show that, if ρ =ŵ 2 /c is sufficiently high, then there exists a θ such that the above strategy constitutes a perfect public equilibrium strategy.
Let x be the algebraic representation of a seller's private reputation profile that arises from mapping every positive outcome in his profile to the digit 1 and every negative outcome to the digit 0. Strategy (31) implies that Ψ(x) = k. For i = 0, the incentive compatibility constraint (30) then simplifies to:
or, equivalently, to:
It is easy to see that if (32) holds then the seller finds cooperation strictly preferable to cheating for all i > 0. The seller's value function (28) then simplifies to:
In the rest of the proof, I will refer to the term 
To show that strategy (31) is an equilibrium strategy, it suffices to show that there exists θ, such that the solution {V (x)|x = 0, ..,2 N − 1} of the system of value functions (33) satisfies the incentive compatibility constraint (32) for all odd x. I proceed by deriving some key properties of the solution of equations (33): 1. For all x ≥ 2 N −1 , states x and x − 2 N −1 correspond to private profiles that differ from each other in the leading digit only (for example, for N =4, if x =15=1111 then x−2 3 =15-8=7=0111). Specifically, state x has a 1 and state x − 2 N −1 has a 0 in that position. Thus, state x − 2 N −1 has one additional zero than state x (formally, z(x − 2 N −1 ) = z(x) + 1). The stage-game payoffs of the two states thus differ by θŵ 2 . Furthermore, x ⊕ 2 N −1 = (x − 2 N −1 ) ⊕ 2 N −1 , which means that the continuation payoffs of states x and x − 2 N −1 are identical. Intuitively, this situation arises because, following the current k -period block, the leading digit on which the two states differ will be eliminated from the profile, and the rest of the two profiles are identical. By substituting the above into (33) we obtain:
2. For all x ≥ 2 N −1 + 2 N −2 , states x and x − 2 N −2 correspond to private profiles that differ from each other in the 2nd digit from the left only. Specifically, state x has a 1 and state x−2 N −2 has a 0 in that position (for example, for N =4, if x =15=1111 then x−2 N −2 =15-4=11=1011). Thus, state x − 2 N −2 has one additional zero than state x (formally, z(x − 2 N −2 ) = z(x) + 1). The current period payoffs of the two states thus differ by θŵ 2 . Furthermore, 2((x−2 N −2 )⊕2 N −1 ) = 2(x⊕2 N −1 )−2 N −1 , and thus, by equation (34), V (2((x−2 N −2 )⊕2 N −1 )) = V (2(x⊕2 N −1 ))−θŵ 2 . Substituting the above into (33) we obtain:
3. Continuing in this manner one can show that, for all x ≥ l i=1 2 N −i , states x and x − 2 N −l correspond to private profiles that differ from each other in the k th digit from the left only, and, furthermore, that:
4. For l = N the above condition becomes:
If we choose θ = c/δ k α k−1 (β −α)
δ ikŵ 2 then comparison of (32) and (37) shows that the solution of equations (33) satisfies the incentive compatibility constraint (32) for x = 2 N −1. By using equation (36) 
The seller's maximum attainable payoff occurs when x = 2 N − 1, i.e. when the seller has no negative ratings in his profile. From (33) and (32) we obtain:
Part 2. To show that for ρ < N/α k−1 (β − α)
δ ik all public perfect equilibria (PPE) attain efficiency lower than V * k , by Proposition 5 is suffices to show that for such ρ there can be no PPE that attains maximum efficiency equal to V * k . The sketch of the argument is as follows:
Assume a nonzero PPE which, according to (26) must have the general form:
Assume, further that the center posts negative ratings during the first j(z) periods when no transaction takes place (see Proof of Proposition 5). The seller's value function (28) then simplifies to:
V (x) = δ j(z(x)) (u(z(x))ŵ 2 − c) + 
Proof of Proposition 4
Consider a k -SBRM with transition probability τ k . Let V + and V − denote the seller's equilibrium value functions immediately following updates that left his profile in the "good" and "bad" state respectively. I will show that, if ρ is sufficiently high, a PPE exists where the seller cooperates with probability one when his profile is in the "good" state and with probability s − k < 1 when his profile is in the "bad" state. I will further show that, in such an equilibrium, it is V + = V * k . Let i = 0, ..., k − 1 denote the number of periods that have elapsed since the most recent update that left the seller's profile in the "good" state. I assume that, following such an update, the seller is indifferent between cooperation and cheating when i = 0 and strictly prefers cooperation when i > 0. This assumption is compatible with the assumption of full cooperation. Its mathematical expression is the following incentive compatibility constraint:
The assumption s − k < 1 implies that during periods when his profile is in the "bad" state the seller is indifferent between cooperation and cheating. Mathematically, this implies the following incentive compatibility constraint:
(40) Constraints (39) and (40) can be simultaneously valid if and only if τ k = (αδ) k−1 . Since I have assumed that the seller is at least indifferent between cooperation and cheating during all periods, the sum of his costs and continuation payoffs is, at all times, identical to that of periods of full cooperation. Based on this observation the seller's equilibrium value functions can be written as:
From the first equation (41) and (39) we obtain:
From the second equation (41), (42) and (39), substituting τ k = (αδ) k−1 and solving for s − k we obtain:
The requirement s − k ≥ 0 implies that a PPE with the above properties exists if and only if:
